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This booklet covering the last six months of our participation
in World War II, tho of necessity brief, should bring to each one of
you an enduring glow of pride in your individual accomplishments
and the magnificent combat record of our Division. Gathering confidence with experience, our Division wrote a brilliant chapter for
itself and for our Army in the Ardennes counter-offensive of December 1944 when, in spite of many handicaps, it stopped the northern
prong of Von Rundstedt's drive and held like a rock at the Elsenqorn
shoulder. Thereafter your battle-field t echnique, dash and gallantry
made you unbeatable and you recorded an unending string of brilliant
victories - on the Roer, the Rhine, the Weser, Leipzig and Pilzen.
You have earned for your Division five battle streamers, the eternal
gratitude of your country and a justifiable pride in our own "Second
to None."
Along th3 way we have left many of our brave comrades. As
we g lory in our fina l victories let us pause and r ender full tribute
to their sacrifices. In humility, let us together salute them and
dedicate our record of victories as recorded here, to their undying
honor.

M ajor General, Commanding
1

INTRODUCTION
.
This booklet is designed to give a general picture of the Second

Infantry Division in its operations from the time it reached the
Siegfried Line in Germany on October 4, 1944, until it arrived in
Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, its location on V-E Day,. May 8, 1945.
A preceding booklet told how the Second, which was activated in
France in 1917 and :which probably gained more renown in World
War I than any other division, opened its campaign in World War II
when it came ashore on Omaha Beach in France, D plus 1, June 7. The
story described the manner in which the wearers of the Indianhead
patch fought their way through Treviers, Cerisy La Foret, and then,
in one mighty effort, crushed the powerful Nazi defenses on Hill 192,
grassy slope holding up the advance on St. Lo.
In the speedy breakthrough South that followed, the Second
stepped out in front and pushed through St. Jean des Baisants, Vire,
and Tinchebray in victorious but hard fighting. It was next ordered
along with two other divisions to take Brest, heavily defended seaport which the Germans had used as a submarine base. After a
bitter four-week struggle, in which the Nazis fought desperately to
prevent the port from passing into U. S. hands, the garrison formally
surrendered to Major General Walter M. Robertson, Division Commander, from Nelson County, Virginia, on September 18, 1944.
The division then moved by truck and train across France and
Belgium to the Siegfried Line, where this story begins.
PRELUDE
"What the Second Infantry Division has done in the past four
days will live forever in the history of the United States Army."
-LT. GEN. COURTNEY H. HODGES.

These were the words that the First Army's commander wired
softspoken Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson, after Nazi Panzer Divisions
tried unsuccessfully to crack the Second's line during the German
winter breakthrough. And these were the words that perhaps better
described the Second's part in repelling the attack than any written
during the period.
It was the Second that held a shoulder of the bulge and for three
days and nights beat back blow after blow by numerically superior
forces seeking to cut through and seize the important road net extending to the North and Northeast. It was a stand made under conditions military textbooks would describe as impossible, but the
Second met the onslaught head-on and smashed back with such fury
that two enemy divisions were badly mauled and a third forced to take
another route of advance.
Maj. Gen. C. R. Huebner, commander of the First Army's V Corps,
said the part of the Second in protecting "the critical Eupen-Malmedy
road cannot be praised too highly." Field Marshall Montgomery also
singled out the Indianhead Division for praise.
More than 100 armored vehicles were knocked out by the division
and two members of the Second were awarded the Congressional Medal
of Honor for braVf~::ry during this period.
2

CHAPTER I
Lull Before the Storm
The Second Division entered Germany on October 4. It crossed
the border in the Schnee-Eiffel, ten miles East of St. Vith, Belgium,
and as its first mission on German soil, took over the defense of a
27-mile sector along the Siegfried Line. This was a sector, supposedly
held by the enemy in light force, through which Von Runstedt's armies
were to strike in the great December counter-offensive, launched five
days after the Second had moved to another sector on December 11.
In the 68 days between October 4 and December 11, the Second
waged incessant patrol and artillery warfare with German troops in
the deep pine forests and ridges of the Schnee-Eiffel. By day and night
reconnaissance patrols roamed the forests seeking out enemy positions Ambush scouts pounced on unwary Germans. Combat groups
jabbed enemy lines and battled enemy patrols in a mine-strewn noman's-land. At night, German patrols made raids through gaps in
the lines that existed in the wide sector. In Schlausenbach, where
the 9th Infantry CP was situated, the bell in the steeple of a tiny 17th
Century Church was used as an "invasion bell" to warn Headquarters
personnel of the approach of infiltrating patrols. On at least one
occasion its toll brought men rushing out into the flickering glare of
flares to defend the CP.
Because of the lengthy front line, certain strong points were
selected for defensive purposes. The Second Engineer Battalion
quickly constructed Tobruk-type bunkers in these areas. Protected by
wire and mines, they could hold a platoon and be defended against
attacks from any direction. Weeks later, when the 106th Division
occupied this area, Von Rundstedt's counter-offensive hit the thinlyheld line with terrific force, but it was several days before he was able
to break through the strong defenses that had peen constructed.
For weeks buzz bombs roared over Second Division lines on rushhour schedule, but damage and casualties were not high.
In November, snows came, and the scene along the front might
have been borrowed from a painting of the winter at Valley Forge.
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Do-nut Dugout.

Small groups of soldiers huddled around
fires that could be
built by day, and
guards stood their
posts in snow several
inches deep. The forests rang to the sound
of axes, as the troops
felled thousand,s of
trees for shelters. The
Division proved rich in
log cabin architects.
Despite the weather, most of the men lived comfortably. One company
built a day room and furnished it with decorations a patrol had seized
in a German hunting lodge in front of our lines. A Ranger Platoon,
between skirmishes with Ger:mian patrols, lived in consummate comfort
in a cabin fitted out with curtains, window panes, a hand-painted
lamp, rug, tables, chairs, bunks, and even a doorbell- a bicycle bell
affixed above the entrance. The 38th Infantry built a log chapel on the
Siegfried Line. The big game hunters at the front shot deer in the
forest and treated their platoons to venison steaks.
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower visited the Second
Division on November 8, and presented Silver Star awards at a
ceremony at the forward CP in St. Vith.
A few weeks later, on November 25, the 23rd Regiment held
what was believed to be the first regimental parade on German soil
in World War II. General Robertson deco'rated a number of men
in the ceremony at
Hemmers.
On November 11 the
D i v i s i o n observed
Armistice Day with a
barrage of small arms,
mortar, and artillery
fire at 11:00 a.m. The

Digging in for the Winter.
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Germans, after recovering from their surprise, made a feeble retaliation. Thanksgiving was observed with a barrage of turkey- which
was not fired at the Germans. The men looked forward to spending
Christmas amid their pine-log luxury, but this was not to be the case.
On December 10, in the midst of a driving snow storm, the
Division started North for an attack on a Siegfried Line stronghold
at Wehlerscheid in the Monschau Forest. The 106th Infantry Division
assumed the defense of the Schnee-Eiffel, and, as the men of the
Second pulled away, there were mutterings about the luck of the 106th
Division inheriting such a quiet sector. But five days later, Von
Runstedt's cyclone struck the 106th in full force, inflicting grievous
casualties. The Second had missed Von Runstedt by five days in the
Schnee-Eiffel, but it was to meet him head-on on the sixth.

*
CHAPTER II

Heartbreak Crossroad
To most men of the Second, the Wehler scheid Offensive became
known as the battle of Heartbreak Crossroad- and with good reason.
It was a savage, costly four-day battle in freezing weather, which
erid.ed with the fruits of victory being snatched away under circumstances utterly- beyond the control of the men who fought there.
The battle of Heartbreak Crossroad was a battle for the Roer
River dams. The Second had the mission of capturing the dams if
possible, or to force the enemy to blow the dams and eliminate the
threat of the floodwaters
wrecking the river crossings
planned along the river. From
Gemund, the river ran North
several hundred miles and was
a dangerous threat to the
Allied advance as long as the
enemy controlled the dams.
The division's mission was an
important one.
Roads into Germany had
proved to be scarce and heavily defended. There was only
one good one leading to the
dams in the division's zone.

Heartbreak Crossroad.
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This ran from Rocherath, Belgium, across the German border
at Wehlerscheid - Heartbreak Crossroad - and thence beyond the
Siegfried Line where it branched into an excellent road net. Along
the German border the Rocherath road passed through the Monschau
Forest, and at Wehlerscheid, in the heart of the forest, Siegfried
Line fortifications were clamped across it like a giant vise. Barring
the way into Germany were 25 concrete pillboxes squatting in the
forest on both sides of the road.. For 200 yards the approach to the
pillboxes had been cleared of trees to give German gunners a field of
fire, and across the clearing, with its profusion of mines, stretched
masses of barbed wire.
A severe ordeal obviously awaited any troops attempting to force
their way into Germany over this route. Yet as the war developed
in early December, the road, as a means of approach toward the Roer
River Dams, became more and more important in relation to the
overall Allied strategy on the Western Front, and the Second Division
was given the mission of smashing through the Wehlerscheid stronghold into the open country South of the dams.
Spearheaded by the 9th Infantry, the division launched its attack
on December 13, driving into the Monschau Forest astride the .
Rocherath-Wehlerscheid road. Hardships beset the troops from the
start. Snow, knee-deep in places, covered the ground and made the
going laboriously hard for doughboys burdened with weapons, ammunition, and packs. The forest was so dense the branches were
interlocked as stiffly as gates, and the men had literally to push their
way forward. To make matters more miserable a thaw was sending
the snow on the pines dripping down on the men, soaking them to the
skin. That night the weather turned intensely cold. They had to
sleep without blankets, and their wet clothing froze.
The attack was not preceded by an artillery preparation. It had
been planned to surprise the enemy, and the regiment advanced
several hundred yards to the vicinity of the clearing around the
pillboxes without opposition. As the assault
companies neared the
c l e a r i n g, however,
leading scouts reported
smoke from e n e m y
fires. D o u g h b o y s
dropped t h e i r overcoats, gripped their
weapons, and forged
ahead across an antitank ditch to the edge
of the clearing.

~
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88's pay us a visit.
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Two hundred yards away, beyond the rows of barbed wire, were
the pillboxes, squat, ugly, half-concealed in scrub pine. As the troops
closed up to the clearing, hundreds of German guns of many caliber
split the silence of the forest. And they exhaled murderous fire. The
attack had been detected when the men crossed the anti-tank ditch.
Machine guns clipped the bushes, kicking up dirt around the embattled
doughboys. Artillery and mortar shells, shearing off the tops of
trees, sprayed shrapnel in all directions. Casualties were heavy, the
toll early in the engagement including the Second Battalion Operations
Officer, the Battalion Commander's radio operator, the Company
Commander of Company G, and the Executive Officer of Company E .

•

Soon after the fire fight had begun a patrol from Company E
wriggled out into the clearing for more than 80 yards t o reach a
slight elevation before the barbed wire barrier. There the men were
stopped by heavy machine gun fire. It was quickly discovered, however, that from this rise in ground a much better view of the pillboxes
could be obtained than from the edge of the clearing. Word was
sent back to the lines. Artillery was notified. Accompanied by two
radio operators, Capt. Homer G. Ross, of Elyria, Ohio, Company
Commander of Company E , crawled out in the face of enemy guns
to join the platoon. From the middle of t he clearing, he directed
artillery fire by radio and succeeded in calling down direct hits on
pillboxes. The patrol, however, could not breach the barbed wire, and,
after the artillery mission had been fired, withdrew.
Meanwhile to the South a remarkable piece of patrol work was
being accomplished- one that was to prove again that the stoutest
iron-and-steel defenses are vulnerable to the courage and tenacity
of a few men. For in the midst of the raging battle 15 men under
Tj Sgt. Clyde A. Dugan, of Canton, Ohio, and Sj Sgt. J ames R. Dunn,
of Mosca, Colo., crawled through the crossfire of machine guns and
the bursts of mortars, cutting the barbed wire and opening a path
that was to lead the two battalions across the clearing and topple
the entire German position.
Soon after the regiment had reached the
clearing, Sgt. Dugan
and nine of his men
from the Third Platoon of Company G
started out on thei r
stomachs through the
barbed wire. Machine
gun bullets crackle d
overh ead. On e m a n
was killed, but ther e
was no turning back.

Through

the Monschau
Forest.
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Yard by yard they toiled across the field through the snow until
they reached the far end where they slid into a zigzag communicating trench linking tw.o pillboxes. At about the same time that
Sgt. Dugan's patrol reached the trench, five men of the First Platoon
of Company G, under Sgt. Dunn, were sent out in support. Two of
them were wounded at the outset and fell back. The others continued
on, with Sgt. Dunn and Sj Sgt. Adam C. Rivera, of Mesa, Arizona,
cutting the barbed wire as they went. By the time they reached
Sgt. Dugan, they had opened a four-foot gap in the wire across the
field.
No sooner had the t'Wo groups joined forces in the trench, however, than the Germans began frenzied attempts to destroy them.
First came a patrol from the pillbox on the right. Bullets whizzed
through the trench. The Americans captured one of th~ Germans
and drove the others back. The captured German insisted that if he
were allowed to return, he could persuade the others to _surrender.
Sgt. Dugan gambled on it and let him go. A little while later there
were sounds of movement, and it began to look as if the gamble had
succeeded. Then a German machine gun muzzle poked slowly out from
behind one of the turns in the trench. When a helmeted head followed
it, no one was willing to gamble further. Sgt. Dugan shot the German
gunner, then leaped out of the trench and fired into the_ rest of the
Germans, killing another man. From the woods came another patrol,
then another and another. For almost five hours Sgt. Dugan and his
men stood off repeated attacks until they were able, under the cover
of darkness, to slip back across the clearing to their lines.
For the next 48 hours Second Division Artillery pounded the
pillboxes, and patrols from the three battalions of the Ninth fought
bloody skirmishes to dislodge the Germans.
Then, after dark on December 15, Sgt. Dunn and an 11-man
patrol from Company G crept out through the breach in the barbed
wire and made their way toward the enemy lines with a soundpowered telephone. An hour passed, then two hours. At last, at
9 :30 p.m. a call came. "The Germans don't seem to be alert," Sgt.
Dunn said in a low voice. "We have surrounded one of the pillboxes.
No opposition."
Lt. Col. Walter M. Higgins, Jr., of Chattanooga, Tenn., Second
Battalion Commander, flashed the word back to the Regimental CP.
A plan of attack was quickly formulated. Company F was sent through
the gap in the barbed wire, making the path with white tape, and
Company E followed. The two companies built up a bridgehead. The
Third Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William F. Kernan, San
Antonio, Texas, was rushed through. The Germans woke up to what
was happening, but too late. Their position was lost in a blazing
attack.
Pillbox doors were blasted open with beehive charges and
bazookas, but sufficient dynamite was not on hand to blow up the
pillboxes themselves. A charge of 1,500 pounds would have been
required for each, and engineers were so busy building and clearing
roads that they were unable to bring up the amount needed to destroy
8

the 24 pillboxes in the area. This did not seem important at the time,
but it was soon to be a cause of bitter disappointment. In the desperate
struggle lying ahead, these pillboxes were to pass once again into
German hands and have to be retaken.
Some of the defenders tried to escape and were killed, many
surrendered. Company L, commanded by First Lt. Melvin S. Goldstein,
of Brooklyn, N.Y., seized a fortified customs house with 77 prisoners.
With the German lines breached, General Robertson acted swiftly
to exploit the advantage. On tQ.e morning of December 16 the 38th
Infantry passed through the 9th to attack towards its objective,
Dreiborn, Germany. During the day the 38th pushed on: 1,500 yards
against resistance that was sometimes very stubborn.
·
Bright prospects were opening to the Second Division. The first
belt of the Siegfried Line had been breached at Wehlerscheid. The
road to Hofen and Monschau and the road to Dreiborn and Schleiden
were ready to fall like ripe plums. It was a moment of well deserved
triumph, but there were somber and ominous overtones, a feeling
that all was not well. German artillery was growing in volume along
the line.
At 10:00 p.m., the telephone rang in the CP of the First Battalion
9th Infantry. Major William F. Hancock, of Ruby, South Carolina,
Battalion Executive Officer, answered it. Lt. Col. Ralph V. Steele,
of Lake Norden, South Dakota, then Regimental Executive Officer,
was calling. His message was not reassuring. There was trouble to
the South; the battalion might have to withdraw in the morning.
The news was scarcely credible. During the night the Germans threw
in sharp counter-attacks around Wehlerscheid.
In the morning battalion commanders were hurriedly summoned
to Regiment. There the full truth became known. A serious German
counter-attack was developing around Rocherath. The 9th and 38th
Regiments must pull back quickly to avoid encirclement and help
stem the attack. The pillboxes so dearly won must be relinquished
without a fight.

9

The word spread among the troops: "We're pulling back." In
the distance was a heavy rumble of artillery. Dog fights raged over·head, and the forest was filled with the diri of anti-aircraft fire. In
this tense atmosphere the 2nd Division broke contact with the enemy
and gave up .Heartbreak Crossroad. Many days were to pass before
it returned.

*
CHAPTER III
No Breakthrough Here

Shadows of the threat from Rundstedt's armor and infantry had
been first cast early on the morning of December 16th when, after
an artillery free period, heavy concentrations of enemy shells rained
on the divisional sector, continuing through the afternoon and night.
On the afternoon of December 16th threatening shadows assumed
a darker and more menacing appearance when General Robertson
received orders not to commit the 23rd Regiment, which at that time
was preparing to move from Camp Elsenborn, site of the Division
rear echelon, to aid in the exploitation of the Wehlerscheid breakthrough. Later in the afternoon one battalion of the 23rd was detached from Division control and attached to the 99th Division to
plug gaps in the lines. Shortly afterwards another battalion was .
attached to the 99th, leaving only one battalion of the 23rd in
Division reserve.
Later in the day Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, deputy commander of .V Corps, and General Robertson held a discussion and
proposed operations indicated a change in plans. The threat to the
division now had become a definite conclusion.
It was hardly 7:30 a.m. on December 17th when General Robertson learned from the V Corps Commander that the enemy was attacking in force along the entire front of other divisions and had already
broken through defenses of a neighboring division on the right and
rear, thereby seriously threatening the 2nd Division flank and Command Post at Wirtzfeld.

The impending storm had struck in fury. The size and proportion
of this gigantic enemy attack was the first indication that the German's winter offensive in the Ardennes had been launched. The 2nd
Division, with two of its regiments miles ahead pressing an attack
of their own, was in a precarious position. To prevent the two
regiments from being completely cut off from the remainder of the
Division, rear echelon and special units must assume the responsibility
of holding the surging tide when it struck until the 9th and 38th could
pull back and establish a defense in Rocherath and Krinkelt.
Almost immediately after word was received that the neighboring
division had been overrun by superior forces of German tanks and
foot troops, the 9th and 38th began disengaging from the enemy and
started a daylight withdrawal from the Wehlerscheid area to defensive
positions around Rocherath, Krinkelt, and Wirtzfeld, covering the
10

roads leading to Eupen and Verviers. The · remammg battalion of
the 23rd, plus a TD Company and a company of medium tanks, started
South at once toward Rocherath, Krinkelt, and Wirtzfeld, the latter
the site of the Division Command Post.
In the next 14 hours, the Indianhead Division, achieved what
military books say is impossible. Against two powerful German
divisions it did a complete turnabout from the offensive to a well
organized daylight withdrawal and defense against a threat from
the flank and rear, then slammed the door in Rundstedt's face.
Uncertainty of the situation on December 16th had resulted in
General Robertson, who years before had become an expert on daylight withdrawals, mapping a plan for drawing back which was
immediately put into effect. Col. Chester J. Hirschfelder, San Antonio,
Texas, commanding the 9th Regiment, was placed in charge of the
disengagement and withdrawal, and Col. P. D. Ginder of San Diego,
Calif., spare combat team commander at that time, gathered all
available men to coordinate defenses Southwest of Wirtzfeld where
the Division CP was threatened.
Meanwhile Col. John H. Stokes, Assistant Division Commander
from Freehold, New Jersey, was put in charge of all troops in the
Rocherath and Krinkelt area, and Division Headquarters was alerted
to prepare for defense of the CP now in imminent danger of being
overrun. German tanks and infantry were already pouring through
disrupted lines of another division into Bullingen, two miles from
Wirtzfeld, where the Second Engineer Company, Second Signal Company, and Second Quartermaster Company were located.
When the first contingent of enemy tanks and infantrymen·
lunged into Bullingen, one group of engineers held them off until the
majority of their force could be evacuated. They later made their way
to a battalion of riflemen and joined in a counterattack on a German
held town. Some of the engineers managed to infiltrate out, but one
group went into cellars and took up the battle. They were ordered
out two days later after artillery fire from both sides made the area
a no-man's land. Twelve members of the Second Signal Company's
supply and repair section concealed themselves in a cellar and when
Nazis occupied the upper floors were forced to strangle their pet dog
"Tuffy" to prevent being discovered. Later, they managed to get
out under cover of darkness. Like the signalmen, the Second Quartermaster Company suffered a severe blow, losing all its supplies and
managing to get out only a few trucks when the quick panzer thrust
hit the town. Some of the men took off across the fields and plowed
through the deep snow to safety. Trapped in a house, nine others
hid inside a creamery vault and watched German tankmen loot U. S.
clothing and supplies. That night they crept out and got back to
American lines.
Overpowering small division forces in Bullingen, hostile armor
and infantry from the crack 1st SS Panzer Division swept on toward
Wirtzfeld where Division Headquarters personnel rallied to stem the
attack until the arrival of infantrymen from the 23rd. When enemy
tanks appeared on the skyline hardly 600 yards from the Division CP
and opened fire on Wirtzfeld, General Robertson bluntly said: "We
11

are going to hold this CP." Then the brilliant Virginia tactician,
part of Division Headquarters defense platoon, cooks, orderlies and
clerks, proceeded to do just that against both tanks and troops.
General Robertson himself helped direct traffic despite enemy tank
and artillery fire, and supervised the placing of anti-tank defenses.
Two enemy tanks and an armored car were knocked out in the first
five minutes of the battle.
Only one road leading from Wirtzfeld to. Elsenborn could now be
used by the division, and this was a muddy, one-way route so bad in
spots that often jeeps had to be winched through. Foresighted engineers, who knew that in the event the main road was cut an escape
route would have to be available, had plotted it and worked over the
worst spots prior to the breakthrough. Now the entire burden of
maintaining the flow of traffic fell on the Division's MP's. Artillery
and long-range small arms fire was falling constantly, but they remained at the posts, helping push stalled vehicles off the road and
hurrying others through. It was only after all vehicles and infantry
•had moved back and the covering force from the 741st Tank Battalion
was ready to pull out, that the MP's withdrew.
While the first enemy thrust at the Division was being repulsed
at Wirtzfeld, and the 9th and 38th regiments were redeploying into
Rocherath, General Robertson learned that the enemy had broken
through another defense line Northeast of Rocherath and threatened
to roll into the town before stabilized defenses could be established.
Meanwhile, the First Battalion of the 9th, commanded by Lt. Col.
William D. McKinley, San Antonio, Texas, had reluctantly abandoned
the 24 steel and concrete pillboxes taken after such bitter fighting,
and was pulling back to the original jumping-off place to safeguard
the East flank of the Division. It was General Robertson, who, in this
emergency was in the field directing his fighting units, that intercepted Company K and the First Battalion of the 9th and led it into
defensive positions along a vital road junction. Orders were to hold
the road at all costs. German armor which had broken through on
the Northeast was expected to use this road network into Rocherath
and the junction must be held if remaining units of the 9th and 38th
were to successfully reach Rocherath.
At 5 P. M. on December 17th word came down that a reinforced
enemy armored column had worked its way into Rocherath and was
being opposed by the 38th's First and Second Battalions. The two
units had been spearheading the Division attack, but had been ordered
to fall back into Rocherath when initial German thrusts resulted in
the Second Division's flanks being exposed.
Commanded by Lt. Col. Jack K. Norris of Payette, Idaho, the
Second Battalion reached the town before the main column struck and
immediately began opposing 12 enemy tanks attempting to overrun
the sector. The First Battalion, led by Lt. Col. Frank T. Mildren of
Los Vegas, Nevada, was caught in route column before arriving, however, and suffered heavy casualties in battling tanks and foot troops.
The two battalions brought much-needed help to the 38th's
Service Company which already had engaged an enemy task force that
12

also had struck at Bullingen and Wirtzfeld. Clerks, KPs, maintenance
men, drivers and telephone operators had been organized into rifle
squads and bazooka teams to halt thrusts on the edge of Rocherath.
While the First and Second Battalions were engaged in stiff
conflict in Rocherath, the 38th's Third Battalion under Lt. Col. Olinto
M. Barsanti of Tonopah, Nevada, was undergoing artillery and tank
fire near Krinkelt, where it had been sent from Regimental reserve to
protect the main supply route.
Throughout the day hundreds of disorganized troops from nearby
units that had been overrun streamed back into the Second's lines in
a frantic search for safety. Doughboys were given orders to hold their '
fire until they were able to ident~fy the advancing forces. At times,
in the murky, foggy atmosphere, this endeavor to spare the lives of'
friendly troops cost the lives of Second Division men behind the guns.
Entire U. S. squads and platoons were wiped out when it was learned
too late that the onrushing horde was German and not American.
The degree to which this, combined with the unnerving appearance of
friendly troops fleeing before the enemy, could have influenced the
morale of doughboys less seasoned than the Second cannot be overemphasized. But the Second held its ground. The disorganized troops
were sifted into the Division and aided in stopping the push.
The night of December 17th was a nightmare for the 38th, commanded by Col. Francis H. Boos of Janesville, Wisconsin. There was
no sleep for anyone. Both enemy and friendly troops occupied Krinkelt. The enemy armored column which had infiltrated unstable lines
kept the regiment alerted throughout the night. Clashes between foot
troops and friendly and enemy tanks were common during the hours
of darkness. Communications between battalions were virtually impossible since artillery had severed all lines. It was not until noon of
December 18th that the enemy finally was ejected from the town and
contact again established with the units. Three of the enemy tanks
had been destroyed within 200 yards of the Regimental Command
Post.
While the 38th was battling tanks and infantry in Krinkelt and
Rocherath during the night of the 17th, the First Battalion of the
9th, at their crossroad position, was hurling back intermittent German
tank attacks.
The Third Battalion of the 23rd absorbed one of Rundstedt's best
Sunday punches in another sector on the night of December 17 when
it repulsed eight enemy attacks. Later this battalion joined tlie Third
Battalion of the 38th Regiment and continued to battle tanks and
infantry for the remainder of the critical period.
But it was the First Battalion of the 23rd, commanded by Lt. Col.
John M. Hightower, Las Cruces, New Mexico, which bore the brunt
of enemy assaults against this regiment and dealt inestimable punishment to the enemy. Fighting desperately on three sides and their
escape route slowly closing behind them, the battalion organized a
nine-man patrol led by Sgt. Floyd R. Swartz, Detroit, Michigan, to
find an outlet from the trap. Without communications since telephone
wires had been shelled and their radios were not functioning, the lives
of many men depended upon this patrol. Finding a suitable route
13
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at Krinkelt

partially obliterated by
fallen snow, the tiny
band made its way in
darkness one and a
half miles to Murringen, Belgium and
then back to the battalion. Within a few
hours the last of the
700 men had been
guided to safety.
Over in another sector, Col. Jay B. Lovless, of San Antonio, ·rexas,
. commanding the 23rd Regiment, became commander of all troops in
the Sourbrodt-Elsenborn area after his three battalions were split
between commands of the Second Division and the 99th. He organized
the "Lovless Task Force" which included a battalion of three rifle
companies formed by Major Frank Hoke, Lebanon, Mo., Division
Special Service Officer, from the rear echelon clerks, cooks, bandsmen,
and drivers. This battalion was known as the "Hoke Battalion." The
"Loveless Task Force" defended the area South of Elsenborn and prepared defenses East of Berg, Belgium, to which the division riflemen
could fall back when the time was ripe.
Surveying the situation weeks later, General Robertson said that
apparently the initial armored attack on the division was by a flank
guard, which haVing hit solid resistance, shied away from RocherathKrinkelt. This striking force, the 1st SS Panzer Division, had an
objective and route further to the South and West in the direction of
Malmedy. The 12th SS Panzer Division followed this later in the day
and apparently had the mission of going through the RocherathKrinkelt Elsenborn area. However, by this time, the Second had
had time to organize its positions. Between these two attacks, there
were abortive thrusts by the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, but these
were handled without great difficulty. Had the attacks by the two
panzer divisions been reversed and the Second hit hard in the morning
before it had time to get set, General Robertson said he believed there
would not have been sufficient strength to stop the blow.
The full force of the German offensive hit the division from three
sides on the morning of December 18th. One tremendous German
attack was intercepted by Lt. Col. William D. McKinley and his first
Battalion of the 9th, which staged a gallant fight to hold the important
crossroads just outside of Rocherath. The onrushing tanks and infantry were met with bazookas, cans of gasoline and phosphorous
grenades while hasty mine fields helped to slow the progress of the
enemy, later identified as the 12th SS Panzer Division. The Nazis
threw masses of tanks and men at the 9th's sector and so severe was
the battle for the crossroads that First Lt. Stephen E. Truppner,
Baltimore, Maryland, whose company had been reduced to approxi14

mately 50 men, called for artillery on his own position. The last words
from the officer were, "Artillery is coming in fine." Only 12 men
from this company escaped, but Lt. Truppner was not among them.
Practically surrounded and warding off attackers on three sides, First
Lt. Eugene Hinski, anti-tank platoon leader from Haddenfield, New
Jersey, intercepted four tanks from the 741st Tank Battalion. They
counterattacked and kept the enemy occupied while the battalion
withdrew. Three German tanks were disabled in this action. Troops
were hard pressed as they took the back door out of the rapidly
closing pocket, and when Col. McKinley and his operations officer left
the site, the enemy was near enough to shout "Hande Roche." This
delaying action in front of Rocherath was a vivid example of the vital
part a small unit can play in a great battle. When the first battalion
of the 9th reached Elsenborn its ranks numbered only 217 out of a
total battalion strength of 860 men.
Repeated enemy attacks by enemy forces ranging from one
platoon to several companies were thrown back by the division
throughout the day. The 38th regiment fighting gallantly on the very
edges of Rocherath and Krinkelt, waged a see-saw battle which became so intense there was no semblance of a front line. At one time
men from the First Battalion were completely cut off from supplies,
but fought back with what they had from basements, attics, barns and
dung heaps. The Anti-tank Company, led by Capt. James Love of
Butte, Montana, had little rest during the melee as all men who could
be spared from the guns fought up front as riflemen. In one enemy
attack, anti-tank personnel and supporting artillery knocked out nine
of 24 attacking tanks. Pvt. Isabel Salzar, Houston, Texas, a cook's
helper, left his pots and pans long enough to knock out two German
tanks with a bazooka and effect a road block for other German tanks.
In one of the grimmest fights of the day, two platoons of Company C
led by Edward C. Rollings, San Antonio, Texas, scattered a German
attack spearheaded by 11 tanks. Fifty Germans were killed and 25
Second Division men captured the night before were rescued. First
Lt. Sidney B. Dane, Chicago, Illinois, rounded up a herd of cattle to
use as a road block when enemy tanks threatened the command post
of the 38th regiment's first battalion. Riflemen from Company F
commanded by Capt. John Dumont, San Antonio, Texas, fought off
three enemy tank and infantry attacks leaving an estimated 75 dead.
Capt. Joseph Skaggs, LaCrosse, Wisconsin, established a defense
around the Regimental CP, and his riflemen picked off infiltrating
Nazis and tanks. His company was credited with disabling five of the
78 tanks claimed to have been knocked out by the 38th combat team
during the three-day period.
It was in this jumbled battlefield around Rocherath that Tj Sgt.
Frank (Hardtack) Kviateck, 47, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, ace
sniper of the division and oldest enlisted man in the 38th regiment,
was captured when his machine gun section was overrun. He had 36
notches on his rifle at that time.

Wire communications had remained in good shape and General
Robertson later commented that he was able to get contact with the
Division CP from various points in its sector almost at will. It had
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been the custom for the Division Signal Company to always lay an
alternate wire lirie. When the main line was cut along with the
supply route from Elsenborn to Bullingen, Murringen and Wirtzfield,
the emergency circuit, running along the only exit road then open,
was used.
General Robertson commenting on the particular action at
Rocherath was inclined to believe that Lady Luck more than ever
smiled on the Second Division. The 12th SS Panzer Division during
the continued attacks it made for 36 hours never once diverted from
its original plan but kept hitting the division head on. Yet for nearly
three days, the flanks of the Second Division were exposed.
On through the night of December 18th and through the day of
December 19th the enemy attacks continued relentlessly. But the
Division by this time. had established contact with all units, and were
fighting an organized, but desperate defense. On the night of December 19th, the Division pulled out of Krinkelt and set up defenses on
the Elsenborn Ridge. By the morning of December 20th it was a
foregone conclusion that one section of Rundstedt's sweep toward
Antwerp had been definitely halted after one of the hardest battles
along the entire First Army front.
The nation's highest soldier honor, the Congressional Medal of
Honor, was later to be awarded two members of the Second for
unusual acts of bravery during these desperate times. Pfc. Jose M.
Lopez, 33-year-old Brownsville, Texas, machine gunner, killed more
than 100 Germans and enabled his company to withdraw from an
apparently hopeless trap. In the 23rd Regiment's M Company, he was
attached to K Company when enemy troops began to break through
the company's left flank on December 17. Grabbing his machine gun,
he lugged it unassisted across the company front to get a field of fire
and then set the weapon up in a shallow hole affording no· protection
from the waist up. He immediately cut down 10 of the Nazis, and
then, when an enemy tank approached, ignored its machine gun and
88 )Tim gun fire coming at him, and killed 25 Germans following it.
Enemy foot troops had
begun to penetrate the
company's lines from
the rear and so Lopez,
still ignoring the tank
fire, moved his gun
back and halted wave
after wave of advancing forces. His deadly
fire had caused the
Germans to concentrate on him, but he
kept the gun blazing
~'

Tiger tank kayoed near
Krinkelt.
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away. A round from the tank landed nearby and the concussion
knocked him over backwards and blew the gun several feet aw~y,
but he yanked it back and opened up again. When the company
finally withdrew, he dropped back 100 yards to another defensive
position and blasted away until his ammunition was exhausted 10
minutes later. He then rejoined his company.
The award also went to T/ 4 Truman Kimbro of Madisonville,
Texas, member of Company C of the Second Engineer's Combat
Battalion. But unlike Lopez, who lived to receive the honor, Kimbro
paid his life on a muddy road near Rocherath, Belgium, on December
17th. Kimbro was lead scout in a squad given the job of mining or
blocking a highly important crossroad well ahead of U. S. front lines.
On getting within sight of the intersection, he found it occupied by a
German Tiger tank and 20 dug in infantrymen. Kimbro tried two
other approaches to lead the men to a point where they could block
the crossroads, but the Germans remained and the assignment appeared an impossible one. Then, in full view of the tank and infantry,
Kimbro crawled to a road leading to the crossroad and began to creep
out to lay the mines. Heavy fire rained down and he was severely
wounded, but he continued on and placed the mines across the road.
On attempting to draw back to safety, however, the fire became even
heavier and he was hit innumerable times. Machine gun bursts
actually rolled his body. Officers said the mines were a definite
factor in delaying enemy armor long enough to permit U. S. forces to
successfully evacuate to Rocherath. They also helped keep the enemy
from attacking the rear of Division forces moving back.
During this border battle 2nd Division Artillery played its most
important role. Massed artillery fire from the 38th, 37th, 12th and
· 15th Field Artillery units, was used to its greatest advantage, resulting
in staggering losses on the enemy and in great measure helping to
stem the tide of the German thrust. When the enemy first struck
the rear of the division, artillery battalions were supporting the infantry attack from extreme forward positions. In order to give supporting fire to the rear where the Division CP was being attacked,
the 12th and 37th Battalions, upon orders from General John H.
Hinds, of San Antonio, Texas, each turned one battery completely
around and placed fire on enemy tanks and infantry within 800 yards
of the CP, continuing at the same time to fire support to infantry
attempting to disengage from their forward attack positions. When it
was learned the Cub air field of the Division on the outskirts of
Bullingen had been overrun, the 37th swept the field with 40-battery
volleys, destroying all planes and denying the use of them to the enemy.
The 38th FA fired over 5,000 rounds on December 18th which indicates the tremendous volume of fire required to stem the attack.
Members of the 12th and 15th FA Battalions made repeated trips to
an abandoned ammunition dump near the enemy front lines while
subjected to enemy rifle and machine gun fire and recovered several
hundred rounds which permitted the battalions to maintain a continuous and devastating fire.
The breakthrough tested the ability of virtually every unit in
the division to function under the worst possible conditions. The
17

Second Medical Battalion had one of the hardest jobs of all. Its
evacuation highway was cut shortly after the attack opened and only
one other serviceable road to the front remained. This, of necessity,
had to be used mainly to bring up ammunition and supplies. The
medics had to plot their own evacuation route, tearing down fences
and shoveling snow to get the ambulances through in some instances.
Back roads, trails and even footpaths were utilized. Other medics were
at the same time venturing beyond U. S. front lines to bring in
wounded left behind as troops dropped back. Despite' intense fighting
going on in the streets, they went out time and again to aid the fallen.
Shells on several occasions blew down walls of the aid stations. So
many wounded were brought in- 1,030 patients were admitted during the December 17, 18, 19 period- that ambulance facilities were
not sufficient and jeeps and trucks had to be commandeered and used
without protection of Red Cross markings.
A captured German major, asked why the German thrust was
unsuccessful, replied, "We failed because our right flank near
Monschau ran its head against a wall." The wall was built of men
who had never known defeat and who would not bring themselves to
admit it. The miracle was created by battle experience and superior
command supervision, and the impossible was turned into victory by
leadership and courage.
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CHAPTER IV
The Road Back

After darkness on December 19th, the last elements of the 2nd
Division had withdrawn and taken positions on the Elsenborn Ridge,
dominating terrain feature overlooking the twin cities of Krinkelt
and Rocherath which were being shelled heavily by American
Artillery.
The Division CP set up at Camp Elsenborn, where plans for
reorganization and regrouping were formulated. Riflemen dug in,
improved their underground homes by insulating them against cold and
dampness with sides of ration boxes and pine boughs, and equipped
them with makeshift stoves made from abandoned jerricans of German milk cans.
On the 20th of December the enemy felt out the defenses with
several small attacks which were repulsed. Deciding that the sector
was too strongly fortified and too firmly held, the Germans made no
further efforts to continue their offensive.
The enemy shelled the Division area with artillery and rockets.
The Luftwaffe reappeared to bomb and strafe supply routes and
elements of the di'vision at Camp Elsenborn. Buzz-bombs sputtered
over the sector on almost constant schedules. It was a cold, white
Christmas for the 2nd Division, but every one was busy with plans
and preparations for future operations. Intermittent snows fell during
the latter part of December and early January.
The 38th Infal).try remained in line and in contact with the enemy
throughout the Elsenborn Defense. The Regimental sector was submitted to heavy enemy shelling for several weeks, and twice the
enemy scored direct hits on the kitchen of Regimental Headquarters.
Scouting and patrolling became the vogue, and Capt. Edward L.
Farrel, Jr., Boston; Massachusetts, carried off top honors ,when he led
two patrols into no-man's-land and brought in a total of 17 German
outpost guards without firing a shot.
Shortly afterwards
three strong combat
patrols cleaned out a
section between Wirtzfeld and Bullingen,
taking 18 prisoners,
killing 39 Nazis and
wounding many
others.
On New Year's Day,
11 hostile planes strafed and bombed the
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division area. Several were shot down by 462nd Anti-Aircraft Battalion gunners, who 4ad been waging a hot fight against the aerial
invaders, and the pilot of one plane was captured.
On January lOth, Col. P. D. Ginder assumed command of the 9th
Regiment.
During the middle of the month Nebelwerfers appeared again on
the Second Division front, and riflemen began picking up a number of
enemy deserters who walked voluntarily into American Lines.
On January 12, the 23rd Infantry Combat Team, consisting of the
23rd Regiment, the 37th FA Battalion and one company each from
the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 741st Tank Battalion, the
Second Engineer Battalion, and the Second Medical Battalion, was
organized and ordered to the Weismes-Robertville-Ovifat vicinity to
prepare for an offensive in conjunction with the First Infantry
Division. It was given as its final objective the Ondenval-Iveldinger
Pass, which had to be taken in order that .the 7th Armored Division
could pass through and recapture St. Vith.
In the bitter fighting which the combat team engaged in from
January 15-20, it gained five miles, took 373 prisoners, killed more
than 500 and wounded a large number of enemy. Fighting was particularly bitter throughout the entire engagement and deep snow and
severe cold made conditions miserable for troops. Numerous mines
were encountered as well as heavy machine gun and artillery fire.
But despite what it was up against, the team functioned so well it drew
an official commendation for its work from the Corps Commander.
The heroic struggle of G Company, which won many laurels for
its battling in hip deep snow and a blizzard, is a good example of the
soldiering that was carried on at a time when all hope of an early .
victory over Germany seemed blighted. Commanded by Capt. John H.
Stephens of Tyler, Texas, the company which entered the action with
· only 100 men, was credited with capturing 150 enemy and killing 100
in four days of bitter strife.
To overcome one obstacle, a crossroads with a cluster of houses,
the officer had artillery and tank guns
force the Nazi defenders into cellars. Then
in a quick maneuver,
the first was lifted arid
two "G" Company
platoons swept 400
yards to successfully
storm the position.
Another time, the capt ain ran into a machine
!"gun nest, but found his
~~
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Foxhole, visitors
welcome.

pistol holster so packed with snow from crawling that he co~ldn't get
the weapon out. Thinking quickly, he grabbed a radio and t)lreatened
to throw it. The bluff worked and the enemy machine gun crew of
two men surrendered, evidently believing the officer was about to
attack them with a secret weapon.
Three days of fighting in sub freezing temperatures with only
an occasional K ration to eat reduced the company's strength to 70
men, but it kept on. In the tiny town of Eibertingen, it ran into some of
its toughest street fighting since Brest, with opposing forces firing
at 12-yard range and exchanging grenades within houses. After the
company killed 50 enemy and took 41 prisoners in the town, the
Germans withdrew and began to organize for a counter-attack. It
never got started, however. Artillery. and a firing line of BAR's and
rifles quickly met the challenge and 160 German dead were counted
when the Americans halted their fire.
On January 30th, the 38th Infantry jumped off in a drive through
deep snow drifts and bitter cold to retake the three towns of Wirtzfeld,
Krinkelt, and Rocherath where it had successfully blocked ·Rundstedt's
December drive. The Ninth Regiment pushed off at the same time
with orders to pass through the First Division, make a limited objective attack and then go through the 38th after Wirtzfeld, Krinkelt
and Rocherath were captured. It was then to continue -into the
Wehlerscheid area which it had previously taken in December. Chief
obstacles were terrain and weather, with snow and forested country
making progress slow and fatiguing. But the division was in a vengeful
mood and anxious to return _to the border towns which by now had
been reduced to shambles by intense allied bombing and shelling.
The Second Battalion of the 38th Infantry took Wirtzfeld without resistance, finding the town and its approaches heavily mined.
Lt. Col. Jack K. Norris, Battalion Commander stepped into a building
to look at his map and he and his forward elements captured six
Germans hiding in the cellar.
From here the First and Third Battalions pushed on into Krinkelt
and Rocherath where enemy delaying action resulted in stubborn and
fierce house to house fighting before resistance was overcome. Led
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Ack ack on the Alert.

by First Lt. Albert
Shelton, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, one
platoon from Company
K, 38th Infantry,
spearheaded the attack
into Krinkelt. They
had been the last men
to leave in December
and were the first to
reenter the shell-splintered town. First Lt.
JohnS. Calhoun, Jacksonville, Florida, assumed command of the company when the commanding officer fell mortally wounded, and retook his old CP along
with 15 German prisoners. While the Third Battalion was mopping up
Krinkelt, the First cleaned out points of scattered resistance in
Rocherath.
On January 31, the Third Battalion of the 9th Infantry, mounted
on tanks, moved toward Wehlerscheid and "Heartbreak Crossroads,"
while the Second Battalion of the 23rd Infantry, attacked along the
road leading to Hellenthal, gateway to the second line of Siegfried
defenses. The terrain was so rugged and the roads so blocked with
snow and ice, that tanks, towing trailers, were used to carry supplies
and ammunition, and to evacuate the wounded. Weasels, the "Jeeps
with tracks," which had been used by the Division in winter maneuvers
in Michigan during the pre-invasion days, were again p~t in use.
February found the division driving back into Germany. On
February 3, 48 days after the withdrawal from Heartbreak Crossroads, the 9th Infantry returned. This time it was different. The
9th Infantry Division, advancing from the North, had out-flanked
Wehlerscheid and the Germans, instead of putting up the desperate
resistance they had offered in December, cowered in the pillboxes
awaiting capture. As men of the 9th Regiment trudged past the old
battle-ground on the way to new ones, they paid silent tribute to the
comrades who fell there and to the four grim days and nights at
Heartbreak Crossroad.
Once beyond Wehlerscheid, the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry,
with Company F mounted on tanks, stormed into the German towns
of Harperscheid and Schoneseiffen, capturing 250 prisoners and
knocking out a tank and self-propelled gun. Entering Harperscheid,
Pvt. Joseph A. Atkinson, Large, Pennsylvania, who had joined the
company only two weeks before, knocked out a self-propelled gun with
a rifle grenade. When a tank moved up to tow it away, S/ Sgt. Vladis
Lucan, Innis, Texas, rapped on the side with his rifle and demanded
that the crew surrender. The crew surrendered. Company E, 9th
Infantry, had hardly set up its CP in Harperscheid when a German
23
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corporal opened the
door and walked in,
surprised to find the
Americans there.
When the 23rd Infantry was held up by
an enemy machine
gun, Pfc. John M.
Packard, Grande,
Oregon, dashed across
an open field and wiped
out the crew with
several bursts from a
tommy gun. On February 3rd the First Battalion of the 23rd Infantry
cleared the town of Bronsfeld, and the 9th Infantry captured
Ettelscheid and Berescheid.
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CHAPTER V
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Pillboxes Behind
One of the thorns in the general push forward was a group of
pillboxes located to the front of Hellenthal which had defied repeated
attempts by XVIII Corps troops to break through and seize the town.
Situated in a narrow valley, Hellenthal had terrain features ideal for
its protection. The entire area was to the right and out of the Second's
sector, but when its troops began to receive fire from this vicinity, the
Division found it necessary to clean out the town and surrounding
high ground. By doing so, it put troops to the rear of the pillboxes
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Crossing the Roer
Heimbach.
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and the Germans hastily abandoned them without a fight and
fled. The obstacle in the path of
XVIII Corps' advance was thus
removed.
The battle for the city was a
tough one, however. The enemy
had good observation on the
narrow, winding roads leading
into the valley, which made it
difficult for U.S. troops to bring
in supplies or to reinforce the
infantry attack with vehicles or armor without the enemy bringing
down heavy concentrations of artillery or mortar fire on the roads.
The Nazis had also blown the only bridge across the Olef River.
thus preventing the employment of armor into the small village until a
bridge could be constructed.
The Second and Third Battalions of the 38th Infantry jumped
off early in the morning and succeeded in reaching the outskirts of
the town without arousing the garrison. The Third Battalion pushed
across the river by wading and swimming in the icy waters and by
evening had secured the Western edge of the town against heavy
resistance. The Second Battalion seized the high ground Northeast
of the town, but when it .tried to take the Southwest edge, the enemy
fought bitterly. By the next morning, however, Hellenthal was in
U.S. hands.
Meanwhile the First Battalion, 9th Infantry, launched an attack
to take Scheurn and the high ground to the West. This was accomplished by the morning of February 6th, after troops ran into a
heavy fire from automatic and small arms. The area was also under
enemy observation and U. S. troops had to be supplied at night.
The Nazis continued to be very active in the Hellenthal area with
patrols constantly probing Division lines. It was during this period
that First Lt. Charles D. Curley, Richmond, Virginia, of "L" Company,
38th Infantry, picked up conversation on his SCR 536 radio from a
German patrol. Using Pfc. Solomon C. Fink of Elgin, North Dakota
as an interpreter, he succeeded in placing mortar fire on an enemy
group trying to probe our lines. The last message heard was simple
and terse: "Those bastard Americans are shelling the road, we can't
get any nearer; there are casualties."
To the North, the Ninth and First Armies succeeded in forcing
a crossing of the Roer River. The Division on February 17th side27

stepped to the North, assuming control of a portion of the 9th Infantry Division's sector, with the mission of controlling a s~ctor south
of the Urft Reservoir, uppermost of the system of Roer and Urft
River dams.
Task Force "S", consisting of the 38th Infantry, the Third
Battalion of the 9th Infantry, 38th .Field Artillery Battalion, Company
"B" of the 741st Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "C" of the 86th
Chemical Battalion, Company "C" of the 2nd Engineer Battalion, and
Company "C" of the 2nd Medical Battalion, became operational on
March 1st. On March 3rd it moved North through the III Corps sector,
crossed into the bridgehead at Heimbach, and attacked South through
·the 78th Infantry Division, advancing approximately 4500 yards
through heavily mined areas and scattered fire. The First and Second
Battalions of the 38th Infantry cleared out pillboxes on the Western
edge of Gemund and on the high ground to the Northeast of Gemund,
and the Third Battalion, 9th Infantry, occupied the town on March
4th. Gemund was a bastion in the final belt of Siegfried Line fortifications and thus, after five long months, the 2nd Division had burst
through the formidable West Wall and was entering upon an entirely
new phase of the war.
By March 6 an enemy withdrawal was definitely indicated, and
the Second advanced rapidly to the Southeast, taking many towns and
villages incll!ding Mechernich, without any show of resistance.
The First Battalion, 9th Infantry, met a delaying force late in the
day as it approached Weyer from the West, and at the same time the
Second Battalion, 23rd Infantry encountered another force Northwest
of N ethen which was quickly overrun. By the close of the day no
enemy resistance was reported on the entire Division front. Of the
43 PW's processed at the Division cage during the period, 35 different
units were represented. As the Division closed on the Rhine River at
Rheineck, delaying forces in moderate strength, employing all available weapons, tried to delay the Division's advance, but to no avail.
On March 11th all organized resistance in the Division zone West of
the Rhine River was
cleared.
Reports of enemy
material captured during the period Ma:r:ch
6-11 indica ted the
haste of the enemy
withdrawal. Several
houses full of ammuni-
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tion were seized in Frohnau and Buir, and 22 carloads in a
tunnel along the railroad west of Schuld. Guns of all calibers, a motor
park of some 17 vehicles, and a map depot formerly belonging to the
Fifth Panzer Army were found along the route of advance.
The Division then was ordered to assume a defensive position
along the West Bank of the Rhine to protect the Remagen bridgehead against water-borne attack. On the night of March 19th the 9th
Infantry Regiments Second Battalion made a night landing attack on
the Rhine island opposite Hammerstein, and eliminated a small pocket
of resistance that had continued to hold out.

*

CHAPTER VI
Victory Ahead
On March 21, the Division crossed the Rhine in the Southern
sector of the Remagen Bridgehead to re-enter an area where the
Indianhead patch was no stranger. Just 26 years before, in December,
1919, the Second had spanned the river in the same section and spent
eight months as part of the Army of Occupation. Even after two and
a half decades, traces and memories of the men from the last war
were still prevalent.
On several occasions, surprised German civilians ran into the
streets, pointing at the patches and jabbering away that they remembered them from many years back. The Second Quartermaster
Company set up its CP in a building in Heimbach and discovered the
Division's 15th Field Artillery had had its CP in the same building in
1919. Pictures of the 15th's band and other members of the unit, their
patches plainly visible, turned up in the quarters, and Heimbach's
burgomeister brought in a mouldy Second Division jacket from World
War I.
Ninth Regiment troops uncovered other photographs, one showing a Second Division soldier standing on the East bank of the Rhine,
with Castle Rheineck, which the 9th captured in this war, in the background. To Colonel
Hirschfelder, who commanded the 9th
throughout most of its
fighting in Europe, th•:')
Rhin e land a r ous ed
strong memories. He
was the only officer in
the Division during its
occupation duty who
had r eturned with the
unit.

Across the Rhine.
Ndr Breisig-Honningen.
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The 38th captured the towns of Segendorf and Rodenbach, where
the 18th company of the Fifth Marine Regiment, part of the Division
in the last war, was billeted. In a building in which the 38th set up a
CP in Rodenbach, a booklet containing pictures and a history of the
18th Marine company was found.
At Gonnersdorf, Herman Krohn, formerly of Milwaukee, who was
in E Battery of the Division's 15th Field Artillery in the last war, was
discovered living with the woman he returned to Germany to marry in
1920. After serving in the Army of Occupation, he obtained his discharge at Fort Slocum, New York, and then sailed for Germany. Now
white-haired and 59, he said he had his fill of the country and wanted
to take his wife and two sons back to the United States "as soon as
possible."
Other old photographs and a 1919 edition of Stars and Stripes
gave further evidence that the Germans either found it hard to
obliterate traces of the Division or had not desired to do so.
But the Division in this war was not merely occupying the area.
It had the important job of broadening the bridgehead and cutting a
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Here we go again.

hole for armor to start
its Eastward push.
What was learned of
the Second's occupation in World War I
had to be gathered on
the run. In the month
ahead, the Division
was to travel close to
400 miles to the very
heart of Germany,
take 19,000 prisoners
and liberate slave
workers and prisoners by the thousands. All phases of Germany murder institutions, concentration camps, Gestapo and SS headquarters, and the tremendous war plants that had kept the Nazi war
machine operating- were to be uncovered.
The Division had relieved the 394th Regiment on reaching the
Eastern bank of the Rhine and set up its Division CP at Honningen.
Then it attacked Southward for five days, taking some 20 towns and
encountering emergency units who opposed the advance with
machine gun, rifle and moderate artillery fire. Following the occupancy of Baumbach, the Ninth Armored Division, with the 38th
Infantry attached, passed through and from then until the end of the
month the Second followed it in a wide encircling move which helped
create the Ruhr pocket on April 1.
Tactical elements of the Division engaged in mopping up bypassed enemy groups and combing the woods and isolated villages.
Prisoners rounded up during this period averaged some 200 a day,
many of them stragglers in the rear areas.
At Hadamar, where the Division located its CP on March 29,
military government and intelligence officers discovered a murder
institution equalling in horror anything ever written by Poe. Germans
themselves estimated that since 1941 at least 20,000 political prisoners, Jews and slave laborers had been put to death. The prisoners,
too weak to work and no longer of value to the Nazis, were
starved to the point of death and then killed by a hypodermic injection. Captain Brinkley Hamilton, attached to the Division's Military Government team, led the investigation, and said that in his 10
years of experience with the London police force he had never seen
anything to equal the methodical cruelty of the plant. Killing of the
10,000th person, officers were told, was celebrated by a party at which
guests drank from one of the victim's skulls.
It was during these days also that the Division began to run
into the first hordes of liberated slave workers and prisoners. Thousands streamed down the 'toads, waving, smiling, and pushing their
belongings on carts or carrying them. The non-fraternization rule
32

d
0

v
1

·t.

art
sh.
of
pa-

. I

on
.th

on
to
ry
y,

rs
re

i~r

'' 1\NO T>\EoR PACKI\&1' FROM $1\M Ill G-ERMANY

e
l.

:1
1

f

I CA>IT UNDERSTAN D HOW T>ic

pEA R 60'f MAIIA HS To BV'f So l'r1Prll'f 6-lFT$ ON HIS SMA~~ SA~A R.y.

11

did not pern;,it ·~ssociation with these tired and ragged people, many
of whom had been. dragged into Germany five years ago, but there
were few doughboys who did not slip them something fro'm their
ration boxes from time to time.
PW cages were bursting with prisoners collected in droves. Many
gave up voluntarily when they saw the fight was over and their lives
no longer in danger. Others changed to civilian clothes and had to
be ferreted out of their hiding places. In Romberg, an advance detail
of 11 signalmen entered a day after armor had passed through and
rounded up 50 prisoners. A short while later the Division CP was
established there. In another case, a woman went to the Military
Interrogation Intelligence Office and said her husband, a former
soldier dressed in civilian clothes, had tried to surrender several times,
but guards could not understand him and he was waved away. Her
request for help in the matter was met.
·
Americans were being liberated also, but some of their stories
were sorry to hear. The Ninth Regiment found 25 emaciated, starved
U. S. soldiers who had escaped from their German captors and met the
Division in Braunfels. One man had lost 30 pounds under the starvation diet and beatings were frequent. At least three Americans
suffocated, they reported, when they spent four days in freight cars,
packed like matches.
The 38th Regiment liberated 47 Allied prisoners near Limburg
and among them acting First Sgt. William E. Woolen of San Antonio,
Texas, Headquarters Company, found T j Sgt. Sim Cartwright, Nashville, Tennessee, whom he had not seen since they served together
in the Pacific nearly 10 years before. Cartwright, captured while in
the 78th Division during the breakthrough, had lost 20 pounds on a
33
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bread and water diet
during one period of
his imprisonment.
At the turn of the
month, the 38th's Anti
Tank Company had
one of the roughest
battles of its career,
battling some 800 SS
troops and 15 tanks in a raging seven-hour struggle in the town of
Bonenburg. Trapped in a pocket, the SS troops had to come through
the town held by the company to escape. When it was over and the
Americans had held firm until tanks and armored infantry relieved
them, more than 200 SS men, clad in sleek black uniforms, were dead,
three truck loads wounded and 40 taken prisoner.
In the first feint, the company's nine 57 mm guns successfully
met the tank thrust, knocking out two tanks and one halftrack. Two
of the guns were silenced, however. First Lt. Joe E Steakley, Abilene,
Texas, who had recently assumed command of the company, felt it was
just the beginning and regrouped his forces. More than 12 hours later,
the vaunted SS men, each armed with a machine pistol and many
with machine guns and panzerfausts also, struck again. Accompanied
by 15 tanks, they swept into the town in a blaze of fire. So close was
the fighting that at times SS troops occupied the ground floor of
houses and doughboys the top. Despite the grave peril it placed them
in, the Americans called for artillery fire on their own positions to help
halt the Nazis. For six
hours the savage
fighting continued.
Then U. S. tanks and
armored infantry
arrived to help the gal•
lant c o m p an y still
holding firm. It s
casualties: Four dead,
20 wounded, thre 8
missing in action.

Ack ack alley at Leipzig.
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On April 1, the jaws of the Ruhr trap ·snapped shut on some
340,000 encircled Germans and the Division swung East again. Since
leaving the Rhine, it had made six moves, established command posts
at Honningen, Niederbieder, Hohr Grenshausen, Hadamar, Romberg
and Sachenhausen. Now the reduction of the pocket was to be taken
care of by other units and the Second struck out in coordination with
the Ninth Armored Division, sometimes mopping up, sometimes
swinging out in front to crush tough obstacles.
At the outskirts to Hofgeismar, it became apparent that the
town was to be stubbornly defended and a heavy artillery barrage was
laid down. It proved a rather curious obstacle. After being softened
up by artillery, it was encircled and tanks pushed through, spraying
machine gun fire. They found a defensive force composed for the
most part of wild-eyed youths from 15 to 18 years old, a majority of
whom had been receiving SS training. The greater percentage fought
courageously in foxholes and buildings, but there were some who had
been taken from their homes in Hofgeismar only several days before.
One told how they gave him a Czechoslovakian rifle, but never a
chance to learn to fire it. Terrified when the tanks and machine guns
opened up, he buried his nose in the corner of a foxhole and waited
for death or capture.
Bridging the Weser River at Veckerhagen, the Second swept
toward one of its richest prizes, the famous old univer~ity center of
Gottingen. It was taken by the 23rd Regiment with the firing of only
a few shots and yielded 23 hospitals with 2,500 German patients, four
Nazi generals and an airfield that was the best captured in Germany
at that date. Fifty German planes, valuable instruments and repair
shops and two American aircraft were found at the field. It was
believed the U. S. ships either had been used in actual combat against
American forces or were being tested to learn their capabilities.
Retreating Nazis apparently left in a hurry as a single plowed furrow
was the only damage to the field.
At a prison camp at Duderstadt, 700 Allied soldiers came into
U. S. hands on April 9th following months of mistreatment, severe
marches, beatings and miserable diets. Fifty of the men were
Americans.
A medley of troops had been opposing the advance so far. Tanks
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Assault across the Weser.

made their appearance
from time to time and
the once-powerful
Luftwaffe e v e n occasionally ventured out
to strafe. Generally,
the defense was scattered with spells of
sharp fighting. Local
reserves, Volkssturm
members and miscellaneous groups came
through PW channels
and one group had been in a battalion of men suffering from stomach
ulcers. They poured in like a mountain brook, with the daily total
generally running over 1,000. Every truck that could be spared was
used to rush them to the rear. This was positive evidence that the
final disintergration of the German war machine was at hand. Troops
looked to the East where the Russians were driving and wondered if
the joining of the two forces would bring V-E. It was a period also in
which almost every doughboy got himself a German pistol. Sending
of souvenirs home began to put a strain on mail facilities of the
Division.
Several tons of documents, believed to be the entire SS Surgeon
General file, were located in Bad Frankenhausen where the Division
set up a command post. Many books, bearing Rimmler's own signature, were picked up along with a card index file to what appeared to
be the dossiers of all party members.
While there was only scattered fighting in the hurried push from
the Rhine, the Second Quartermaster Company was tackling its
greatest problem. It had a four-fold job. Tremendous quantities of
gasoline had to be hauled to keep alive the hundreds of vehicles in the
division, and thousands of prisoners had to be transported to the rear.
Then in addition to moving its own large organization on each new
advance, the trucks had to carry forward Infantry troops and the
Division's Headquarters. It was a job that left little time for any-.
thing but work, and that's about all that was done. Truck drivers
went for days at times with just a few hours of sleep and hurried
meals of cold rations. Often supply dumps were moved just behind
spearheading armor in order that the Second, when it came through
mopping up, would find its stores ready. Some drivers covered 400
miles in a single day, and as much as 40,000 gallons of gasoline were
brought forward. Prisoners in tremendous numbers had to be sent to
the rear.
In the Leuna-Merseburg area, the wearers of the Indianhead
patch ran into one of the heaviest concentrations of ack-ack guns in
Europe, and the hardest fighting they had encountered since crossing
36
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the Rhine. For the entire 14-mile stretch into Leipzig, they received
furious artillery blasts from some 1,000 pieces that formerly protected
this vital industrial area, but were now slashing at advancing ground
troops with tremendous barrages. Many veterans said it was the
heaviest artillery fire thrown at them since they came ashore in
France 11 months before.
The Ninth Armored Division had turned South to by-pass
Leipzig, leaving the Second the task of driving through the flak belt.
Augmenting the 88 mm to 128 mm flak guns in each battery were
numerous lighter caliber pieces, particularly multiple 20 mm guns. In
some cases super batteries had been formed of three ordinary batteries
and as many as 40 guns were emplaced at one location, generally in
pits of brick with dirt piled around to a thickness of 30 feet. Communications trenches added to the picture .
At the approach of hostile ground forces, the Germans utilized
the flak positions as strong points, sending direct fire hurtling at
armor moving across the flat terrain and air bursts at infantry.
When the troops drew close to the positions, the gunners fought as
infantry from the trenches, at times with fanatical zeal. Often it
was necessary to blast them out with grenades.
Merseburg, near where Germany's largest synthetic rubber plant
was located, and Leuna, chief synthetic gasoline producer for the
Reich, both were taken on April 15. Long a top priority bomb target,
Leuna was a shamble of iron and steel when Ninth Regiment troops
pushed into the tremendous plant. A year before it had been making
10,843,373 gallons of gasoline a month, but repeated air missions. had
cut the output to 1,446,975 gallons and it finally folded up in March.
A subsidiary of I. G. Farben, it produced the vile-smelling gasoline
from coal and coke and employed 28,000 persons, about 10,000 being
slave workers. Nitrogen and coal alcohol also were turned out in
smaller quantities.
Merseburg was stubbornly defended by 2,000 Volkssturm members,
supplemented by Luftwaffe and labor troops, who used small arms,
machine guns, ack-ack
and panzerfaust fire
to good advantage. It
also marked the first
time the Volkssturm
had put up any form
of an organized
struggle against the
Division. One battalion
of the 23rd Regiment,
which took the town,
was cut off inside the
city when heavy con-

The last round-up at
Leipzig.
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centrations of ack-ack fire knocked out tanks and jeeps coming in
behind for support. With murderous ack-ack fire falling on the
battalion, U. S. Aid men and a German nurse and driver made a series
of mad dashes to a Nazi hospital on the opposite side of town to carry
out wounded. Following an all-night struggle, the town finally was
cleared and 1,000 Volkssturm members taken prisoner. It also yielded
an airfield and a number of planes.
A large percentage of prisoners taken during this time were from
the countless ack-ack batteries and a few were on the balmy side.
One, ordered to stand at attention, burst into gales of laughter.
Another, asked for his Soldier's book, leaped into the air and jitterbugged off to hide behind a trailer.
Many German Wacs were among the prisoners also. Some had
been members of trial flak batteries to determine if women could be
used successfully in this type of work. On April 7, aircraft in raiding
the Leuna works dropped a bomb wide of the target and hit the trial
battery, blowing off 'legs and arms and causing hysteria among the
Wacs. Prisoners who told the story said the high command concluded the experiment had not been a success and relieved the women.
Most of the battle for Leipzig was fought in the flak belt outside the city. Once that was pierced, the intense artillery concentrations dropped off and the going was much easier. The Second's
part was to advance to the Weisse-Elster Canal, which separates West
Leipzig- almost a third of the city- from the other portions. It
was also to seize any bridges it found intact. The 69th Divis1on had
the mission of entering from the South and occupying the city.
The 23rd Regiment, followed closely by the 38th, was the first
American unit to enter the city. Anti-tank, panzerfaust and intense
small arms fire was thrown at U.S. tanks and infantry as they neared
the canal, but they managed to push across on April 18 and secure
three bridges found intact.
In its first attempt to cross the Zepplin Bridge, the lead platoon
of the 23rd Regiment met an intense barrage of machine gun and
small arms fire and after sustaining numerous casualties was forced
to pull back off the span. SjSgt. Ernest L. Barber, of Tionesta, Pennsylvania, who was serving as lead scout, continued on across alone,
however, and killed two Germans in hand to hand combat. In the
action despite heavy U. S. artillery and mortar fire falling on this
side of the canal, Barber began a one-man rampage, capturing five
enemy and assaulting and killing the crews of two machine gun positions. The grinning doughboy, who then returned to the bridge and
gave valuable information to his company coming back across, was
credited with killing at least 11 Germans and covering 400 yards in hjs
heroic sortie.
.
Fifth Corps had given orders for the division to continue into the
city, but shortly afterward the command was to hold up and allow the
69th Division to come North and effect a meeting. This was done
and the city fell the next day.
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In addition to its other values, Leipzig enabled the Division's
702 Ordnance Company to resume its practice of getting essential
materials from civilian sources when the Army was unable to supply
them quickly. Guns and trucks were rusting for lack of OD paint so
500 gallons were obtained in Leipzig. Bushings to keep the trucks
running were also located. Ever since the Second had taken up
positions along the German border and the wear and tear of war had
begun to impair the efficiency of equipment, First Lt. Robert W.
O'Banion, Ordnance Supply Officer from Houston, Texas, had been
buying and requisitioning from civilian factories in Belgium and
Germany.
Leipzig in U. S. hands, the Second moved swiftly to the Mulde
River to take up a defensive position and await a possible link-up with
the Russians. Scores of anxious war correspondents roamed the
Division for days after its artillery observation planes spotted Red
columns moving up from the East. The linkup, which occurred at
Torgau, was further North and out of the Division's sector, however.
Hundreds of Germans, caught between the two Allied forces,
sought to cross the Mulde into U. S. lines during this time. Many had
fled before the American advance, but now chose the U. S. as the
lesser of two evils and wanted to return. But the policy was firm:
German soldiers could come over into PW cages, the others must stay
where they were.
There was every indication during the Division's stay in the Mulde
River defensive positions that it had fought its last campaign against
the Germans and was to sit tight until the fast-collapsing Nazis
called it quits. But, as it so often happens for the doughboys, there
was one more job to be completed. The Division was transferred from
the First to the Third Army and a swift motor trip carried it 200
miles South to an area along the Czechoslovakian border. The collapse
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of the German war machine then was in its final stages and in the
Division's seven-day campaign in Czechoslovakia, the job mainly was
one of clearing towns of German remnants and taking masses of
prisoners. May 6 was a :Red Letter Day in this latter respect with
8,000 giving up. This was the largest number of prisoners captured
in a single day by the Second.
V-E and the wildly enthusiastic ovation given the Division by the
happy Czechs made a tremendous climax for the war in Europe. In the
Czech border towns, with heavy German populations, there had been
little cheering. But on the approaches to Pilsen and in the city itself,
the Czechs lined the roads and streets in a demonstration of gratitude
t hat correspondents said was even greater than that of Paris.
The 16th Armored Division had taken the city and when the
S econd arrived soon afterward, the local populace was just beginning
to realize the wonderful news that for the first time since 1939 they
were free. This was one day before V-E, but it was the beginning of
the carnival spirit that seized the Czechs and Americans alike and continued for days. Each of the white-starred American vehicles received
.a separate greeting as the Division rolled into the city. The crowds
packing the sidewalks increased as the day wore on and as the last
troops arrived at nightfall, the enthusiasm was probably at its highest
pitch. Pilsen's mayor, just released from a concentration camp and
given his job back, brought the traditional Czechoslovakian welcome
of bread and salt to General Robertson and some of the country's
finest musicians, allowed to play only certain compositions under the
Nazi Regime, held a concert for the American commander.
The official V-E announcement the next day brought further
c elebration and entertainment by the Czechs in honor of their
Liberators. Dances and parties also were held by the Division, but the
question in most of the doughboys' minds was whether this marked
the war's end for them or whether they would have to begin another
-campaign in the Pacific. This tempered news of the war's end and
although there was happiness and satisfaction, there was no wild
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elation. For the civilians of Pilsen, the war was over, but for the
Americans it was a different story.

e
e
11

The Division had spent 320 days in combat since coming ashore
on D plus one, June 7, 1944. It remained in line 71 straight days in
Normandy. And after taking over positions in Germany on October 4,
it was committed continuously for 217 days until the end of the war.
The troops were tired and weary of war and new countries. But
although two enemies had been defeated, they knew that one still
remained.
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INDIANHEAD ROLL CALL
Commanding General ... ..... ............ Major General Walter M. Robertson
Division Artillery Commanding General- Brigadier General George P . Hays,
Commanding July 1, 1942 to November 14, 1944.
Brigadier General John H. Hinds, Commanding since November 14, 1944.
Assistant Division Commander .......... Brigadier General John H. Stokes, Jr.
Chief of Division Staff ......... ..... .............. Colonel Ralph W. Zwicker
INFANTRY REGIMENTS
9th Infantry Regiment - Colonel Chester J. Hirschfelder, commanding June
10, 1942 to January 10, 1945.
Colonel P . D. Ginder, commanding since January 10, 1945.
23rd Infantry Regiment ................................ Colonel J. B. Lovless
38th Infantry Regiment .............................. Colonel Francis H. Boos
ARTILLERY BATTALIONS
12th Field Artillery Battalion ....... . ............... Lt. Col. Alvan M. Muldrow
15th Field Artillery Battalion ....................... Lt. Col. Robert C. Cassibry
37th Field Artillery Battalion- Lt. Col. Tobias C. Eastman, to April 26, 1945.
Major Earl Hurt, since April 26, 1945.
38th Field Artillery Battalion . . ... . ... . ............... Lt. Col. Donald C. Little
SPECIAL UNITS
2nd Engineer Battalion Lt. Col. Robert B. Warren, to January 17, 1945
Lt. Col. Robert E. Snetzer, since January 17, 1945.
2nd Medical Battalion .................................. Lt. Col Cecil F. J orns
SPECIAL TROOPS
Headquarters Commandant ......................... Lt. Col. Matt F. C. Konop
Headquarters Company .......................... Captain Frederick A. Palmer
2nd Signal Company .................................. Captain Keith IE . Hall
2nd Reconnaissance Troop ....... .. . .. .... .......... Captain General P. Hefley
2nd Quartermaster Company ................ Captain Raymond A. Brimmer, Jr.
702nd Ordnance (LM) Company ........................ Captain Otto H. Allen
Military Police Platoon . .............. . .... . ... . .. .... Major William F. North
ATTACHED UNITS
741st Tank Battalion . ...... .. .............. .... . . . . Lt. Col Robert W. Skaggs
462nd AAA Battalion . .. ..... . ....... .... ....... .... Lt. Col. Norman R. Stultz
612th Tank Destroyer Battalion .... .. .. .. . . ...... ... Lt. Col. Joseph M. Deeley
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HEADQUARTERS VIII CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 308, U. S. Army.

Belgium,
ll December 1944.
Major General Walter M. Robertson, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, 2nd Infantr.)'. Division,
APO 2, U. S. Army.
My dear General Robertson:
On the eve of the relief of the 2nd Infantry Division from
the VIII Corps, for important duty elsewhere, I desire to take this
opportunity and this means to express to Jou, your officers, and your
·enlisted men my appreciation for the excellent service rendered while
in this comn:and.
The 2nd Division was assigned to the VIII Corps .late in
August, 1944, for the special mi~sion of reducing t~e important enemy
stronghold at Brest, France. Subsequently, the division moved east
with the Corps and has occupied a defensive sector along the German
border north of Luxembourg. The superior manner in which the division
conducted itself at Brest is known to all and is now histroy. Since
leaving Brest, the division has cont i nued to perform its work in a
most satisf.)ing manner.
In departing the VIII Corps, we shall miss the cheerful
attitude, excellent spirit of cooperation, and willingness and ability
to do the job, so evident in the 2nd Division. We shall watch with
interest the future actions of the Division. We feel confident that it
will alwa.)'s acquit its~lf in a superior manner.
If the opportunity permits, please express my thanks and
.appreciation to the officers and men of .)Our division for their excellent work since joinging the Corps. To you personally, I thank sincerel.)' for your spirit of cooperation ana the able manner in which
~ou have ·led the division.
Sincerely yours·,

/s/ Troy H. Middleton
/t / TROy H. MIDDLETON,
Maj o.r General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
AG 201.22
1st Ind.
(11 Dec 44)
HEADQUART ERS 2D' INFANTRy DIVI ~ IO~, APO 2, U. S. Army, 17 December 1944.
·TO:

All Officers and Enlisted men of the Division.

It is a great pleasure to transmit to the officers and men of
the 2d In f a n tr~ Division this well deserved commendation. I wish to
add ffij own appreciati on for the courage, stamina and fortitude which
has carried .)OU forward from vi~tory to victor.)• With just pride in
another job well done, I again salute jOU.

W. M. ROBERTSON,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

4-1

11EAJ:QUARTERS V CORPS

United States Army
Office of the Commanding General

1 Jenuary 1945
l~y

dear Robertson:

I wi~~ to expre s s to you and the members of your command my
appreciation and co!'llllendation for the fine job you did in preventing the
enemy from carrying out his Plano to break through the V CorP• s ector and push
on to the Meuse River. Not only did your command assist in effectively
frustrating that particular part of the plan ,. but it also inflicted such heavy
los•es on the enE>IDY that he lias unnble to carry out other conte!11Plated missi on&
in other sectors of the Allied front.
General Von Manteuffel, Commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, stated
in the address to his troops prior to the attack that "Our ground mission must
be continuous: o the,..·is e we will not echieve our goal". Due, in p a rt, to the
?nd Infantry Divi•ion, thia ground mission has not been continuous, an~ he
will not achieve his goal.
My eincere thanks for all that you have done for the Allied cause
during 1944, and best viahee for even greater and more deci sive successes
during 1945.

Sincerely,

I •I
ltl

Gerov

L, T, GEROW,

Major General, u. s. Army,
Commanding.
Commanding General,
2nd Infantry D1 vision,
,\PO 2, United States Army.

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
Office of the Commanding General

7 March 1945

SUBJECT:

Commendation.

TO

Commanding General, 2d Infantr,y Division, APO 2, U. S. Army.

:

1. On 13 December 1944, while the 2d Infantry Division was
in the midst of an offensive operation aimed toward the capture of
Dam No. 5 on the Urft River, the now historic German counteroffensive
struck a formidable blow on the V Corps f1·ont. To the northwest in
the Monschau area, heavJ enem~ attacks were received on 16 December,
and to the south the 99th Infantr,y Division was attacked by powerful armored and infantr~ forces. Serious penetrations were made in
the 99th Infantry Division sector in the Krinkelt-Bullingen-Eutgenbach
area. It became necessary to suspend your attack and to intersperse
2d Inf'antry Division units with elements of the 99th Infantry Division
along the general line - Rocherath-Krinkelt-Wirt~feld-Butgenbach.
2. Due to the rapid mo~emen t of 2d Infantry Division units
into the line and stubborn and courageous fighting on .,he part of
all troops engaged, the Elsenborn hinge of the Corps front, "Purple
Heart Corner", was held against a series of furious enemy assaults.
This spirit of ~ourageous defense was demonstrated all along the
line and the desperate enemy efforts to break through and sei~e control of the Elsenborn plateau and the i mportant roa·d net extending
to the north and northeast were frustrated.
3. Following the defeat of the German counteroffensive in
the Ardennes Salient, the 2d Infantry Division resumed the offensive
on 30 Januar> 1945, retaking the towns of Wirt"feld, Krinkelt and
Rocherath and generally restoring the line as it existed prior to
16 December 1944. The attack was continued su~cessfully, resulting
in the capture of Harperscheid, Ettelscheid, Bronsfeld, Hellenthal,
Scheure n and the high ground along the west bank of the Urft River
overlooking Schleiden. The operations of the 2d Infantry Division
-during this period contributed greatly to the success of V Corps in
capturing the series of dams on the Roer and Urft Rivers.
4. During these actions, the 2d Infantr~ Division inflicted
upon the enemy heavy losses in personnel and equipment. The magnific ent defensi ·, e stand, at "Purple Heart Corner", blunting the fury
of the hostile attack and protecting the critical Eupen-•almedy road,
cal'..not be praised too highlv.
5. My personal thanks and appreciation to the 2d Infantr~
Division for its note worthy and commendable achievements during
the period 12 December 1944 - 12 Februar,y 1945.

C. R. HUEBNER,
Major General, U. S. Arm~,
Commanding.
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''1 KNEW 50M£; SOME I SAW; PART OF IT I WAS.
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